Abstract-A multiparty bidirectional quantum secure communication protocol is proposed with two-photon entanglement and quantum dense coding, in which the qubit transmission forms a closed loop. In this scheme, each user performs the unitary operations according to his secret information to encode the exchanged messages into the particle sequences. Then, each participant can extract the other participants' secret messages by implementing Bell measurements on the encoded particles. Thus all the users realize the direct communication simultaneously. Finally, the security analysis shows that our scheme is secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is an important branch of quantum cryptography. It is different from quantum key distribution in which two parties have to distribute a shared secret key before they make a secure session in the quantum channel [1] . However, QSDC can allow the messages to be read out directly when one user sends the encoded particle sequences which contain the secret messages to the other user. The receiver can read out directly the other user's messages without the secret key through the unitary operation.
In 2002, Long et al. [2] proposed a first quantum secret direct communication scheme with EPR pairs. Then Beige et al. [3] proposed a QSDC protocol based on the exchange of single photons. In the same year, Boström et al. [4] proposed a deterministic secure direct communication procotol named 'ping-pong' protocol based on EPR entangled states, which was improved by Li et al. [5] . In 2011, Deng et al. [6] proposed two-step quantum direct communication protocol using the EPR pair block. However, the transmission of secret messages is unidirectional in QSDC. Then Nguyen [7] proposed a kind of protocol called quantum dialogue. Later, Jin et al. [8] proposed a three-party quantum secure direct communication based on the GHZ states, which was improved by Man et al. [9] . Wang et al. [10] proposed a three-party QSDC scheme with EPR pairs, and their protocol was improved on the quantum channels and the efficiency by Chong et al. [11] . Unfortunately, in 2013, Yin et al. [12] pointed out that [10] and [11] can leak out the secret messages of the legitimate users with the classical correlation or information leakage [13, 14] .
In this paper, we propose a multiparty QSDC protocol by using the correlation of two-particle EPR pair. All the parties in our scheme are peer entities. Every participant is both a sender and a receiver and forms a return qubit circuit. The transmission direction has the characteristics of unidirectional circulation. One party can obtain the other parties' secret messages through performing the joint measurement on the encoded particles. The rest of our scheme is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the whole protocol in detail. Section 3 analyzes the security of this protocol. Finally, Section 4 gives a conclusion briefly.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT PROTOCOL
Two assumptions are given the four Bell states can be written as Table 1 . ("O1" denotes the operation on the particle 1; "O2" denotes the operation on the particle 2)
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All the parties agree that the unitary operations on the particle 1 f an EPR pair is the following Fig. 1 . Similar to the previous steps, we can implement the protocol until the n-th loop if the security checking of quantum channels is passed.
Step 6. The n-th transmission loop. The user +(n-1) i u performs the corresponding operation by his own message +(n-1) i M and the rule (2). That is,
Then he inserts randomly decoy particles into Now we analyze the security of our scheme. From the seven steps, we can see that there must be a security check over quantum channels when one party sends a particle sequence to another party. On the other hand, the decoy particles are chosen from {| 0 ,|1 ,| ,| } 〉 〉 +〉 −〉 randomly.
Thus, if Eve is an evil eavesdropper who wants to obtain the secret messages to be exchanged between the three parties, one of attack strategies that she may takes is the interceptresend attack. When Eve captures the particles in the quantum channel, she replaces her own particles and resends them. However, since the decoy photons are randomly inserted into the sequence, Eve cannot know the positions and the measurement basis of this particles. Suppose τ is the number of decoy particles, then Eve could not been detected is 1/ 4 τ . In fact, this kind of detection method is same with that in BB84 protocol. Another attack strategy is the entangle-measure attack. That is, Eve prepares an ancillary particle E and performs a unitary operation U on E and the intercepted particle. Thus we have 00 01
:| 0, | 0, |1, U e e e 〉 → 〉+ 〉 , 10 11 |1, | 0, |1, e e e 〉 → 〉+ 〉
The whole system is in the state 
